Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

THE MAJOR PREMISE OF DUNS SCOTUS'S IMPRESSIVE PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD HAS BEEN NEGLECTED. THAT PREMISE, "THE MOST PERFECT BEING IS INFINITE," IS ESTABLISHED IN TWO WAYS. THE KEY PREMISE IN EACH WAY IS THE PROPOSITION, "POSSIBLY, SOME BEING IS INFINITE." THIS PROPOSITION CANNOT BE PROVEN TO BE TRUE, NOT BECAUSE IT IS IN ANY WAY DUBIOUS OR LACKING IN EVIDENCE, BUT BECAUSE ITS TERMS ARE SIMPLE AND NOT SUBJECT TO PROOF OR FURTHER ANALYSIS. BEING IS (...) THE SIMPLEST AND MOST IMMEDIATE OF CONCEPTS; AND BEING INFINITE IS SIMPLY THE NEGATION OF BEING FINITE. INSTEAD OF PROOF, SCOTUS PRESENTS "PERSUASIONES", SKETCHES OF LANGUAGE-GAMES TO SHOW THAT THE PROPOSITION IS TRUE. (shrink)

In this historical contribution, we assess Duns Scotus’s analysis of atonement (Commentary on the Sentences bk. III). We also include a partial exploration of his analysis of penance (Sentences bk. IV), because certain topics which we tend to discuss within atonement-theory, for example the analysis of the virtue of punishment, pertained to the subject of penance for Scotus. In recent scholarship, Andrew Rosato has argued that Scotus adapted the Anselmian non-penal view of Christ’s substitutionary satisfaction to (...) the penal understanding of satisfaction operative in penance. In this contribution, however, we argue that Scotus’s understanding remained non-penal: his view of the atonement depends on meritorious supererogatory acts of love. Additionally, we harvest some valuable Scotistic insights for atonement-theory, some of them applicable to penal theories as well. (shrink)

In this monograph, Antonie Vos Jaczn surveys John Duns Scotus's theological thought, with an eye to its potential impact upon the future of Christian theology. His survey is constructed as a far ranging tour which ends, as it were, at its beginning. In chapters 1-2.1 he sketches in the societal, institutional, and biographical circumstances of Scotus's life and thought. In 2.2 he takes on the complex of problems inhering in the difficult and confused character of extant literary (...) witnesses to his thought. In the process, he argues persuasively for the hermeneutical priority of the Lectura when attempting to reconstruct and represent Scotus's authentic doctrine. (shrink)

This volume contains 14 studies on various aspects of Duns Scotus' philosophy. Duns Scotus is one of the most important philosophers of the Middle Ages. His radical conception of contingency means a break in the history of thought. Despite his importance, he has not yet been studied very much. The contributors to the volume discuss a.o. Duns' view on will and intellect, on the law of nature, on man, and on aspects of his logic and (...) metaphysics. (shrink)

The idea of a special connection between the thought of John Duns Scotus and that of his forebear, Henry of Ghent, goes back to the time of Duns himself, and in the modern scholarly world it is as old as the critical study of medieval philosophy. Moreover in the last four decades there has been a proliferation of articles claiming that one cannot understand Duns until one has mastered the work of Henry. Nowhere has the connection (...) between the two stood out in sharper relief than in the related areas of epistemology and noetics, and here most especially on the matter of the analogy or univocity of the concept of being. (shrink)

A rather popular mixture of biography, philosophy, and theology, for the Catholic layman. Scotus' role in the defense of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception receives special emphasis. --A. C. P.

Horan offers a substantial challenge to the narrative of radical orthodoxy's idiosyncratic take on Scotus and his role in ushering in the philosophical age of the modern. This volume not only corrects the received account of Scotus but opens a constructive way forward toward a positive assessment and appropriation of Scotus's work for contemporary theology. --Book cover.

Scotus’ natural theology has distinctive claims: (i) that we can reason demonstratively to the necessary existence and nature of God from what is actually so; but not from imagined situations, or from conceivability-to-us; rather, only from the possibility logically required for what we know actually to be so; (ii) that there is a univocal transcendental notion of being; (iii) that there are disjunctive transcendental notions that apply exclusively to everything, like ‘contingent/necessary,’ and such that the inferior cannot have a (...) case unless the superior does; (iv) that an a priori demonstration of the existence of God is impossible because there is nothing explanatorily prior to the divine being, and so, reasoning must be a posteriori, from the real dependences among things we perceive to the possibility of an absolutely First Being (The First Principle); (v) that such a being cannot be possible without existing necessarily; and (vi) that the First Being (God) is simple, omni-intelligent, free (spontaneous), omnipotent and, positively infinite;[1] and moreover, (vii) that there is a formal distinction, that is more than a distinction within our concepts or definitions, among the divine attributes. He makes that first point obvious throughout his several treatments, that one cannot reliably reason from conceptual consistency for us to the real and formal possibility or necessity of something; one must reason only to those necessities that are conditions of the possibility of what is known to be actual. The schema of the reasoning is, in a word, that “only the existence of God can make an effect even possible”[2]. Thus, it is explicitly incorrect to classify him along with St Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz, among those who reason a priori to the being of God[3]. He characteristically and deftly argues by indirect proof. He supposes the opposite of his intended conclusion and deduces a contradiction between that supposition and certain self-evident, or previously proved propositions, thus, getting his own conclusion by using the principle that whatever entails the denial of what is already known to be so, is false and its opposite is true,[4] “si negatur negatio, ponitur affirmatio.”[5] He also uses the argument form, “ if ‘p’ is not necessary, then ‘not-p’ is possible”.. (shrink)

In his Ordinatio, Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's ratio. Scotus' representation of the argument in Ordinatio I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, which lays no claim to coloratio, eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms «being», «non-being» and «the highest» the existence of the highest. In the coloratio {Ord. I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression «that than which nothing (...) greater can be thought» with the concept «the highest thinkable», by which he means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a coloratio rationum Scoti. (shrink)

Tranlsation of Duns Scoto. Reprint of the 1961 ed. published by Catholic University of America Press, Washington. Bibliography: p. 201-213. Includes index.

In Hoffmann’s estimation, beginning with Henry of Ghent but only fully with Duns Scotus, a fundamental shift occurred in the Latin scholastic discussion of what had come to be called the “divine ideas.” Up to Henry and Scotus, the “common opinion” of scholastics was that divine ideas provided the intellectual vehicle by which God knew things other than himself, and the important problems to be resolved in their regard concerned the mechanics of creation and the vexing question (...) of how to reconcile the multiplicity of what God knew, including the ideas, with divine simplicity. After Scotus, everything changed. Arguing that God alone, without any special enabling vehicle, sufficed to account for his own cognition, Scotus turned to conceiving the ideas as the objective content of God’s knowledge of things, irrespective of their existential status in the world. In so doing, he substituted for the old problems of creation and multiplicity within simplicity the new ones of the foundations for possibility and the ontological burdens of intelligibility. (shrink)

[1] In twelve quite demanding chapters, outstanding scholars provide an overall view of the key issues of Scotus’s philosophical thought. To this a very concise introduction is added, concerning the life and works of John Duns (very good, especially the survey of works and the information on critical editions etc.). Throughout the book, I find the information clear and the difficult topics well explained. Moreover, the volume gives a quick entrance to the vast literature. Among the topics discussed (...) are: ‘Metaphysics’ (Peter King), ‘Universals and Individuation’ (Timothy Noone), ‘Modal Theory’ (Calvin Normore), ‘Natural Theology’ (James Ross & Todd Bates), ‘Philosophy of Mind’ (Richard Cross), ‘Cognition’ (Robert Pasnau), ‘Moral Dispositions’ (Bonnie Kent). What strikes the eye is the absence of important theological subjects: Trinity, Christology, sin and grace, to name a few. Since the cover text promises that ‘the essays in this volume systematically survey the full range of Scotus’ thought’, this omission is remarkable. It stems, I guess, from the strict philosophical scope of the series of the Cambridge Companions, but such a limitation should have been recognised explicitly: this companion provides, in fact, an introduction to John Duns’s philosophy—i.e., philosophy in our modern sense. Of course, this separation of philosophical from theological thought is not from Scotus. Most of his innovative ‘philosophical’ ideas are developed in a profoundly theological context! (shrink)

After a quarter century of research and teaching, Bernardino Bonansea offers here a clear, solid and comprehensive study of the principal elements in the teaching of the Master of the Franciscan School. He recognizes the on-going nature of the project to edit critically the works of this medieval schoolman, yet presents this study as representing the best that can be said on Scotus' positions from the most reliable of his works available. Bonansea's purpose includes both accuracy of documentation and (...) clarity of exposition. He aims likewise to include an occasional comparison of his views with other medieval thinkers. (shrink)

Robert Grosseteste.--Thomas of York.--Roger Bacon.--John Pecham.--Richard of Middleton.--Duns Scotus.--Conclusion.--Bibliography (p. [409]-412).

In this clearly written and impressive volume, Giorgio Pini has provided the first systematic book-length study of Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the categories and an extremely useful sketch of his views on logic generally. Divided into six chapters, the work covers the gamut of interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories over the course of the thirteenth century, ranging from the views of Robert Kilwardby and Albertus Magnus in the 1240s to the leading opinions of the 1280s and 1290s, those (...) held by Radulphus Brito, Simon of Faversham, and Peter of Auvergne. Through this survey of historical background to Scotus’s logical, metaphysical, and theological works, the reader becomes readily acquainted with the systematic options for understanding categories, both in logic and in metaphysics, while appreciating all the more keenly the full bearing of Scotus’s own teaching. (shrink)

The first doctrine Peckham mentions as being under attack is of undoubtedly the TDI, according to which human beings are illuminated by "the unchangeable light" so as to attain the "eternal rules." This language of light and illumination is of course most closely associated with Augustine, but it permeates the entire Christian medieval tradition. Until Aquinas's time the TDI had played a prominent role in all the most influential medieval theories of knowledge, including those of Anselm, Albert the Great, Roger (...) Bacon, and, especially, Bonaventure. However, by the beginning of the fourteenth century the theory had fallen out of fashion. Indeed, the three best philosophers of the scholastic period--Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham--would all reject the theory in its standard form. Even by 1285 supporters of the TDI such as Peckham were evidently feeling rather defensive. It seems entirely plausible to attribute this attitude, in large part, to the influence of Aquinas's views on human knowledge. (shrink)

J'entreprends de défendre la conception leibnizienne de la liberté de la volonté selon laquelle on peut être libre sans que l'on n'ait le pouvoir causal de choisir autrement que l'on ne fait. La liberté d'indifférence en revanche est irrecevable et sort d'une analyse erronée de ce que c'est un pouvoir de décider hic et nunc. Un tel pouvoir est indiscernable d'avec la décision même. Par conséquent un recours à la liberté d'indifférence préconisé entre autres par Duns Scotus est (...) à la fois superflu et aporétique. (shrink)

Scotus - unlike Thomas Aquinas - never commented on Aristotle's Politics nor did he write any significant political tracts like Ockham. Nevertheless, despite his primary philosophical reputation as a metaphysician, Scotus did have certain definitive ideas about both politics and the morality of the marketplace.

This study comprises an analysis of the Categories commentary of Peter of Auvergne, based upon an edition from the manuscripts, and supplemented by a translation. Much information about other Categories commentaries has been included to place the work in its historical and philosophical perspective. ;Peter of Auvergne, active in Paris in the late thirteenth century, had a long career as an Aristotelian commentator and continuator of Thomas Aquinas. His Categories commentary provides me the occasion to survey the genre of Categories (...) commentaries from the early Middle Ages, with special emphasis on those few commentaries known to immediately precede Peter of Auvergne, and on those he influences. Peter is an early representative of the modistae, philosophers who stressed the parallel connections among being, understanding, and signifying, and who are typified by their use of the modi significandi as a tool of analysis. ;This study, the first full-length analysis of a medieval Categories commentary, serves as a guide to the issues generated by Aristotle's Categories. As a comparative study it shows that the genre of Categories commentaries, within a fairly invariant format, allows for a continuous adaptation and development of ideas. As a specific study of an individual commentary, it shows the details of Peter of Auvergne's interests in linguistic analysis, theology, and the exegesis of Aristotle. ;The questions in Peter of Auvergne's commentary are generalizably of two kinds: short, superficial questions which imitate earlier traditions, and more complex questions which attempt original interpretations. Not suprisingly, the latter sort of question finds more parallels in later commentators, including Simon of Faversham, Radulphus Brito, and John Duns Scotus. ;This dissertation, beginning from a thorough exegesis of a central figure, by tracing derivative and influencing themes, gives a dependable picture of the debates conducted in connection with the Categories in the High Middle Ages. I have had the responsibility of editing many of the primary sources I needed. The extensive appendices contain, besides an edition of Peter's Questiones super Praedicamentis, a transcription of another related commentary, Anonymus Matritensis: Questiones super Praedicamentis, and many relevant texts grouped by category. (shrink)

Dialectics is the theory and method of cognition of reality, the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society and thought. The term "dialectics" has had different uses in the history of philosophy. Socrates regarded dialectics as the art of revealing the truth through the clash of opposing opinions, a means of conducting scholarly conversation leading to true definitions of concepts . Plato termed dialectics a logical method which, when employed in the analysis and synthesis of concepts, (...) provides knowledge of that which truly exists — the idea — the movement of thought from lower to higher concepts. The Sophists put the word "dialectics" in bad odor, calling it the art of presenting the false and dubious as the true , while the Megarians called dialectics the art of dispute . In Aristotle's philosophy, dialectics is a means of proof when one begins from propositions that are obtained from others, and the truth of which is unknown. Aristotle distinguished 3 types of inference: apodictic, which is suitable for scientific proof; dialectic, which is employed in argument; and eristic. In dialectical proof the point of departure is probable judgments, from which one arrives at probable conclusions. It is only by accident that truth may be found by dialectical inference. Eristic inference is inferior to dialectic, for it leads to conclusions that are only apparently true . In medieval philosophy the term "dialectics" was employed in the widest variety of meanings. Duns Scotus called dialectics a special teaching on the real; while Abelard called it the art of distinguishing between truth and falsehood . The term "dialectics" was employed in the sense of "logic" and sometimes it was understood to be the art of discussion. (shrink)

There is often said to be something peculiar about the history of modal theory up until the turn of the fourteenth century, when John Duns Scotus decisively reframed the issues. I wish to argue that this impression of dramatic discontinuity is almost entirely a misimpression. Premodern philosophers prescind from the wide-open modal space of all possible worlds because they seek to adapt their modal discourse to the explanatory and linguistic demands of their context.

In this book, John Hare talks about the relationship between theism and the moral theories of four influential philosophers: Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and R. M. Hare.

The philosophical writings of Duns Scotus, one of the most influential philosophers of the Later Middle Ages, are here presented in a volume that presents the original Latin with facing page English translation._ CONTENTS: _ Foreword to the Second Edition. Preface. Introduction. Select Bibliography. I. Concerning Metaphysics II. Man’s Natural Knowledge of God III. The Existence of God IV. The Unicity of God V. Concerning Human Knowledge VI. The Spirituality and Immortality of the Human Soul Notes. Index of (...) Proper Names. Index of Subjects. (shrink)